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STATEMENT

John MASLEN

*

Professor Soltysinski has suggested that the words "countertrade" and
"compensation", which have replaced older terms such as "switch deals" and
"barter", are used in a pejorative sense. I do not use them in that sense at all.
They describe existing forms of trade which, when considered objectively, can
be of mutual advantage to the parties involved. I must take issue with the
Professor when he challenges the assumption that countertrade is usually more
advantageous to the Eastern exporter than to the Western firm involved. There
are, no doubt, cases where countertrade is more to the advantage of the
Western firm, but studies show that about 80% of the time compensation is
asked for by the Eastern partner.
Although Western firms may be willing to go along with countertrade deals,
there is little doubt that they would in most cases prefer "normal" trade. The
kinds of difficulties firms experience may be summed up under four main
headings.
(1)Pre-contract negotiation. Negotiation of countertrade deals can be so
complex that one wonders how they ever are concluded. In fact, many firms.
especially smaller ones, are so discouraged by their experiences that they refuse
to engage in East-West trade at all.
(2) Identification of counterproducts.East European countries have particular trouble identifying suitable products for use in counterpurchase. Quality.
packaging, and servicing are often uncertain, even when a product is found
which the Western firm can sell. In addition, counterproducts may suddenly
become unavailable.
(3) Pressure to engage in countertrade. In recent years, pressure from nonmarket economy countries to engage in countertrade has increased in many
ways. Some examples of that pressure are demands for higher compensation
ratios, shorter time-limits for the completion of contracts, higher penalties for
nonfulfillment, and insistence on countertrade for even the most routine sales,
such as service contracts and spare parts.
(4) Impact of counterproducts on the home market. Finally, there is the
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problem of the impact of counterproducts on the Western market, especially if
they are imported at low prices to help offset the additional costs involved in
countertrade. Counterproducts may cause or threaten to cause market disruption for which the importer may face antidumping and other defensive actions.
What should we, as Western governments or the European Community, do
about countertrade? First, I agree with those speakers who have said that
countertrade is initially a question of commercial judgment to be decided by
the firms themselves. I do not think that either the Western governments or the
Community want to prevent or encourage such deals, or to impose some kind
of code of conduct on firms which engage in countertrade. Does this mean,
however, that Western governments should do nothing to point out to East
European countries the difficulties which are created for East-West trade by
countertrade practices? Does this mean that governments should do nothing to
help firms, especially small firms, which are faced with these difficulties? These
are issues that we must address.
An important issue, raised by Professor L6wenfeld, concerns the ability of
Eastern enterprises to insulate themselves from antidumping actions by arranging prices with their Western partners through countertrade. In certain sectors
there seem to be significant price declines which do not give rise to complaints
from the Western producers, presumably because these producers are themselves involved in countertrade deals on the products in question.
Finally, there is the larger issue of the political impact of a country's
involvement in countertrade and the extent to which participation in East-West
trade and cooperation blunts Western responses to unacceptable political
developments in the East. In light of President Reagan's latest announcement
assuring continued grain sales to the Soviet Union, it does not appear that
involvement in long-term economic cooperation has forced the President to
moderate his stance toward Soviet political activities. There is no reason why
we should not combine trade with the East with vigorous condemnation of
their political system when necessary.
Like Professor Lwenfeld, I agree with those who think and hope that the
development of East-West trade will facilitate East-West political relations.
Although the tendency has been the other way in recent years, the process is
bound to be a long one, with many ups and downs. Nevertheless, we should
not give up the hope that in the long run, East-West cooperation in the
economic field will ease the tension between the two systems.
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